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Existing experimental studies have shown that an outside option, when offered to one of 
the  two  players  who  later  participate  in  a  battle-of-the-sexes  game,  facilitates 
coordination by making the equilibrium that favors the same player focal. Since the other 
player’s payoff in the outside option was lower than that in the focal point, it is possible 
that there was a reciprocal motive of the other player to coordinate on the focal point. 
Then it is possible that the actual power of the outside option to generate the focal point 
was  either  lower  or  non-existent.  The  current  paper  reports  results  of  an  experiment 
designed to test for the focal point effect of the outside option by controlling for the 
reciprocal motive of the other player. The results confirm that the outside option can 
generate the focal point even when the reciprocal motive is absent. In fact, the saliency of 
the focal point is higher after controlling for reciprocity.  
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1. Introduction 
Previous experimental studies (Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe and Ross, 1993 and Shahriar, 
2009) have shown that an outside option, when offered to one of the two players in a 
battle-of-the-sexes (BOS) game, can facilitate coordination by making the equilibrium 
that favors the same player focal. Since the outside option gives both the players lower 
payoffs than the focal point does, it is not clear whether it is solely the outside option or it 
is  also  the  reciprocity  of  the  other  player  (the player  who  is  not  offered  the  outside 
option)  that  generates  the  focal  point.  The  objective  of  the  current  paper  is  to 
experimentally investigate the actual focal-point generating power of the asymmetrically 
offered  outside  option  mentioned  above.  Specifically,  the  paper  tests  (1)  whether  a 
reciprocal motive of the player who is not offered the outside option contributes towards 
making the focal point more salient, and (2) whether the focal point at all exists when 
such a reciprocal motive is absent. 
  Consider the BOS game in Figure 1. It is a symmetric 2x2 coordination game in 
which two players (Row and Column) simultaneously and independently choose between 
two strategies – 1 and 2. The game has two pure-strategy Nash equilibria; (1,2)
 and (2,1).
1  
In  the  mixed-strategy  Nash  equilibrium,  both  players  choose  strategy  1  with  ¼ 
probability and obtain an expected payoff of 150 points. Now, consider the game BOS-
100 in Figure 2. This is a two-stage game in which an outside option is offered to the 
Row player in the first stage. If she decides to take the outside option by choosing Out, 
then the game ends; both players receive 100 points. If, instead, the Row player chooses 
In, then the players play the BOS subgame. BOS-100 has two pure-strategy subgame 
perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) – 
  
(In,1), 2 ( ) and 
  








                                                 
1 The elements in a strategy profile correspond to strategy choices by Row and Column, respectively. 
2 There were 165 observations in total in the last 11 rounds of each treatment in both the studies. 
3  All the tests reported in this paper are two-tail Chi-square tests. 
Figure 1: BOS. 
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    Cooper et al. (1993) and Shahriar (2009) report results from experiments on BOS 
and  BOS-100.  Table  1  below  shows  their  results  from  the  last  11  rounds.
2    The 
coordination problem in BOS is evident in both the studies. Conditional on a subgame 
equilibrium being played, we cannot reject the  hypothesis that the two  equilibria are 
equally likely in BOS (
2 2 χ  = 0.53, p = 0.47 and χ  = 0.45, p = 0.50 in Cooper et al., 1993 
and Shahriar, 2009, respectively).
3  In BOS-100, the Row player seldom takes the outside 
option. Conditional on the  subgame being played, the relative frequency of the Row 
player’s favorable outcome (2,1) is higher in BOS-100 than in BOS and this difference is 
significant (
2 = 64.29, p < 0.01 and 







Figure 2: BOS-100. 
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Shahriar, 2009, respectively). This shows that the (2,1) outcome is a focal point in BOS-
100.
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  Notice, however, that the Column player’s payoffs in both the subgame equilibria 
are higher than her payoff in the outside option in BOS-100. So, when the Row player 
rejects the outside option, the Column player may appreciate the decision and reciprocate 
by trying to coordinate on the equilibrium favorable to the Row player. The Column 
player will, therefore, choose strategy 1 in the subgame. Now, if the Row player correctly 
anticipates  the  Column  player’s  intended  play  following  the  rejection  of  the  outside 
option, she will reject the outside option and choose strategy 2 in the subgame; the (2,1) 
outcome will result in. So, the saliency of the focal point that we observed in Table 1 
might partly be a result of reciprocity by the Column player and it is also possible that the 
outside option may not result in the focal point when the reciprocal motive of the Column 
player to coordinate on (2,1) is absent. 
  The goal of the current paper is to check the possibilities mentioned above. The 
paper considers a game similar to BOS-100 in which an outside option is offered to the 
Row player.  The outside option, however, gives the Column player a payoff higher than 
that in (2,1). The results from the experiment on this game show that, even when there is 
no reciprocal motive for the Column player to choose strategy 1, the outside option still 
makes the (2,1) outcome focal. The paper thus contributes to the literature on focal points 
by  confirming  the  focal-point  generating  power  of  an  asymmetrically  offered  outside 
option in the BOS game.
5 
                                                 
4 Notice that the forward induction argument does not apply in BOS-100 as the Row player is unable to 
signal her intended play in the subgame by rejecting the outside option. See Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) 
and Van Damme (1989) for discussions on forward induction. 
5 For a survey on coordination and focal points, see Camerer (2003). 
Table 1: Results of Experiments from the Last 11 Rounds of BOS and BOS-100. 
 
Outcomes 
  Games 
Outside 
Option 
(2, 1)  (1, 2)  Disequilibrium: 
(1,1) and (2,2) 
Cooper 
(1993) 






BOS-100  3  102  5  55 
(63%)  (3%)  (34%) 






BOS-100  9  59  26  71 
(38%)  (17%)  (45%) 
Note: Figures in the parentheses show the frequency distribution in each treatment among four outcomes 
– (1, 2), (2, 1), (1, 1) and (2, 2).   4 
  The  rest  of  this  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  describes  the 
experimental design, Section 3 discusses the results from the experiment and Section 4 
makes some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Experimental Design 
In order to test for a confounding effect of the reciprocal motive mentioned above, we 
consider the M-BOS-100 game in Figure 3. In the first stage, the Row player decides 
between an outside option and playing the BOS subgame. If she takes the outside option 
by  choosing  Out,  then  the  game  ends;  the  Row  player  receives  100  points  and  the 
Column player receives 300 points. This game has the same two pure-strategy SPNE’s as 
BOS-100 –  (In,1), 2 ( ) and  (In,2), 1 ( ).  
  Notice that the M-BOS-100 game shares the same asymmetric feature as BOS-
100 – the outside option is offered only to the Row player in both games. So, if an 
asymmetrically offered outside option is able to generate a focal point, then the same 
focal point should arise in both games. In M-BOS-100, however, the Column player 
receives a higher payoff in the outside option than in the (2,1) outcome. This game thus 
leaves out the possibility of any reciprocal motive of the Column player to coordinate on 
(2,1).  
  The experimental design used in this paper is adopted from Cooper et al. (1993) 
and Shahriar (2009). Three sessions are run; each session recruited 11 subjects. Upon 
arrival at the lab, a subject was seated in front of a computer terminal and was given a 
copy of the instructions.
6  The instructions were also read aloud. Each session consisted 
of 22 rounds of M-BOS-100 and lasted for about an hour.  








  In each round, one subject was matched with another subject. Thus, in each round 
there were 5 pairs; one subject was sitting out. Within each of the 5 pairs in a round, one 
subject was assigned the role of Row and the other Column.
7  In a random manner, each 
subject played exactly twice with another subject (once as Row and once as Column) and 
seated out once during the entire session. So, in each session, each subject participated in 
20 rounds; playing as Row in 10 rounds and Column in the other 10 rounds.   
  At the end of each round in a session, a subject earned points according to the 
choices made. This point determined the probability of winning in a binary lottery with 
                                                 
6 A copy of the instructions is available at www-rohan.sdsu.edu/~qshahria/Instruction-M-BOS-100.pdf. 
7 At the beginning of each round, subjects were privately informed of their assigned roles via the computer 
terminals in front of them. 
Figure 3: M-BOS-100. 
 
               
           100 
           300  Out 
     Row 
   




      BOS 
   5 
two outcomes – $0 and $3. To implement the lottery, at the end of each round, the 
computer generated random numbers between 0 and 1000 for each subject separately. If 
this number was less than or equal to the points a subject received in that round, then the 
subject  earned  $3;  she  earned  $0  otherwise.
8  Through  out  the  session  each  subject 
accumulated her earnings which were paid in cash at the end of the session. The average 
earnings were about $20.  
  The experiment was run at the Economic Science Lab (ESL) at the University of 
Arizona. 33 undergraduate students were recruited for the experiment. All the sessions 
were computerized using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
 
3. Results 
The results from the experiment on M-BOS-100 along with those on BOS and BOS-100 
from Shahriar (2009) are summarized in Tables 2 and 3.
9  Table 2 reports separately the 
frequencies of the outcomes in the first and the last 11 rounds of the sessions; the latter in 
italics. In a similar manner, Table 3 lists the frequencies of strategies played. 
 
Table 2: Frequencies of Outcomes in First and Last 11 Rounds  
(Last 11 Rounds in Italics). 
Treatment  Outside 
Option  Outcomes in the Subgame 
(2, 1)  (1, 2)  (1, 1)  (2, 2) 
























































      
 
 
   
 
  Conditional on a subgame equilibrium being played in M-BOS-100 (Table 2), we 
can reject the hypothesis that the two subgame equilibria are equally likely (
2 χ first = 10.88, 
                                                 
8 The points a subject received in a round divided by 1000 gave the probability of winning $3. So, higher 
points gave higher probability of winning. 
9 The experiments reported in this study and those in Shahriar (2009) are run using the same subject pool 
and the same experimental design and protocol. So, the results are comparable across studies. 
Note: Percentages are given in parentheses; for outcomes in the subgame, the 
percentages show the distribution of the outcomes only within the subgame. 
The  percentages  for  the  outside  option  show  the  proportion  of  165 
observations in which the outside option was taken.   6 
p < 0.01 and 
2 χ last = 43.68, p < 0.01).
10  Conditional on the subgame being played, the 
relative  frequency  of  the  subgame  equilibrium  (2,1)  that  favors  the  Row  player  is 
significantly higher in M-BOS-100 than in BOS (
2 χ first = 5.44, p = 0.02 and 
2 χ last = 27.46, 
p < 0.01). These test results show that, similar to what we saw in BOS-100, the outside 
option offered to the Row player makes the (2,1) outcome a focal point also in M-BOS-
100.  
 
Table 3: Frequencies of Strategies Played in First and Last 11 Rounds 
(Last 11 Rounds in Italics). 
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  The  focal  point  effect  of  the  outside  option  can  also  be  seen  in  terms  of  the 
frequencies with which players choose their strategies. Conditional on the subgame being 
played,  in  M-BOS-100  compared  to  BOS,  the  Row  player  chooses  strategy  2  with 
significantly higher proportions in both halves of the sessions (
2 χ first = 6.89, p < 0.01 and 
2 χ last = 14.18, p < 0.01) and the Column player chooses strategy 1 with significantly 
higher proportions in the second half of the sessions (
2 χ first = 2.72, p = 0.10 and 
2 χ last = 
20.25, p < 0.01). 
  The results discussed above confirm the focal point effect of the outside option in 
M-BOS-100. The results also verify that the outside option can generate the focal point 
even when there is no reciprocal motive for the Column player to coordinate on (2,1). It 
is, however, interesting to see that the saliency of the focal point has actually gone up in 
M-BOS-100 compared to that in BOS-100. The Column player’s inequality aversion can 
be a possible explanation for this observation.  
  If the Column player is inequality averse, then it is possible that she prefers an 
equitable payoff distribution more than an unequal distribution in which she has a higher 
payoff.  With  equal  payoffs  in  the  outside  option  of  BOS-100,  an  inequality-averse 
Column player may prefer the outside option to (2,1).
11  So, when the Row player rejects 
                                                 
10  Within the parenthesis, we report the test results for the first and the last 11 rounds, respectively. In the 
remainder of the paper, whenever we report two results in this manner the results are to be interpreted this 
way. 
11 Using both Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) models, one can easily show that 
an inequality-averse Column player may prefer the outside option to (2,1) in BOS-100.   7 
the  outside  option  and  chooses  to  play  the  BOS  subgame,  the  Column  player  may 
perceive this as “unfair” and may choose strategy 2 to punish the Row player. Notice 
that, in BOS-100, 27% of the time the Column player chooses strategy 2. 
  Since  the  outside  option  in  M-BOS-100  gives  unequal  payoffs,  an  inequality-
averse Column player may prefer it to the outside option in BOS-100 and may therefore 
perceive it to be less unfair when the Row player rejects the outside option in M-BOS-
100.  In  that  case,  the  Column  player  will  respond  to  the  focal  point  effect  more  by 
choosing strategy 1 with a higher proportion. The Row player, in anticipation of the 
Column player’s play, will also choose strategy 2 with a higher proportion. The saliency 




The goal of this paper was to check for the actual focal-point generating power of an 
outside option which is asymmetrically offered before players participate in a BOS game. 
The experimental results in Cooper et al. (1993) and Shahriar (2009) have shown that, 
when  an  outside  option  is  offered  to  one  of  the  two  players  in  a  BOS  game,  the 
equilibrium in the BOS game that favors the same player emerges as a focal point. It was, 
however, not clear from these earlier studies whether the focal point effect was magnified 
by a confounding effect of a reciprocal motive of the other player. The results from the 
experiment in this paper show that the outside option can generate the focal point even 
when there is no reciprocal motive of the other player to coordinate on the focal point. In 
fact,  the  saliency  of  the  focal  is  higher  in  the experiment  discussed  here.  The  paper 
proposes inequality aversion as a possible explanation for this finding. Future extensions 
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